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SPORTING CHANCE: LITIGATING SEXISM 
OUT OF THE OLYMPIC INTERSEX POLICY  
Samantha Glazer 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, 2011, the International Olympic Committee 
(“IOC”), the “supreme authority of the Olympic [m]ovement,”1 
released a statement on the need to promulgate a clear set of 
rules governing the inclusion of intersex2 athletes in time for the 
2012 Summer Olympic Games in London.3 The IOC’s Executive 
Board (“EB”) met for two days in London to discuss the issue 
of the eligibility of female athletes with hyperandrogenism,4 a 
condition where a woman possesses elevated androgen levels—
typically involving increased amounts of testosterone.5 The 
resulting principles, a product of two separate meetings in 2010 
                                                          
 J.D., Brooklyn Law School 2013, B.A., Wake Forest University, 2010. I 
would like to thank my mother for her constant support and thoughtful 
critiques during the process of writing this Note. Special thanks to Karen 
Schneiderman for her help in selecting such an engaging subject and to the 
entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their tireless edits and 
assistance. 
1 The IOC: The Organisation, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/ 
about-ioc-institution (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
2 “Intersex refers to the atypical appearance of the external genitalia at 
birth where they differ from the usual development of either sex and create 
difficulty in sex assignment.” Robert Ritchie et al., Intersex and the Olympic 
Games, 101 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 395, 395 (2008). For a more complete 
discussion of intersex, see infra Part I.B. 
3 IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, 
OLYMPIC.ORG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution? 
articleid=124006. 
4 Id. 
5 Stephen Franks, Medical Progress: Polycystic Ovary Syndrome, 333 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 853, 853 (1995). 
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of the IOC Medical Commission and International Association of 
Athletic Federations (“IAAF”)6 and adopted by the IAAF, 
constitute the most recent attempt to regulate intersex athlete 
participation in the Games.7 The IOC’s guidelines may be clear 
cut, but they have a discriminatory effect on female athletes.  
The IAAF first introduced a means for determining an 
athlete’s sex in 1966.8 Since then, there have been several 
iterations of sex tests developed by the IOC and IAAF.9 Scholars 
have noted that traditionally, sex testing within the realm of the 
Olympics has been justified on two grounds: (1) “sex exists in a 
binary” and (2) “fairness in sport requires a strict separation of 
the sexes.”10 These premises, however, reflect a flawed 
understanding of sex and competitive advantage, respectively.11 
While “sex verification supposes that every athlete can be 
assigned to one of two sex categories,” scientifically, “[s]ex 
cannot be distilled to a single determinable factor” that 
conclusively indicates man or woman.12 Moreover, though the 
notion of fairness in sport is well intentioned, sex verification is 
an incomplete remedy for equality in competition because factors 
aside from sex contribute to an athlete’s competitive advantage.13 
Despite its faulty logic, sex testing continues to be a focus of 
                                                          
6 The IAAF is the International Sports Federation (“IF”) that governs the 
worldwide administration of track and field events, referred to as “athletics.” 
International Sports Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/ 
content/The-IOC/Governance/International-Federations/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012); International Association of Athletics Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, 
http://www.olympic.org/iaaf-athletics-road (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). For 
further discussion of the relationship between the IOC and IFs, see infra Part 
II.A. 
7 IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, 
supra note 3. 
8 Anna Peterson, But She Doesn’t Run Like a Girl . . .: The Ethic of 
Fair Play and the Flexibility of the Binary Conception of Sex, 19 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 320 (2010). 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
10 Erin Buzuvis, Caster Semenya and the Myth of a Level Playing Field, 
MOD. AM., Fall 2010, at 36, 36. 
11 See generally id. 
12 Id. at 37–38. 
13 Id. at 38. 
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sports governing bodies.14 As the tradition of sex testing persists, 
it is critical to recognize that its effects remain predominantly an 
issue for female athletes.15 Even the IOC’s most recent 
guidelines reflect an understanding that female, not male, 
athletes will be held to arbitrary standards of acceptable 
androgen levels.16 
This Note asserts that the IOC’s guiding principles for 
regulating the inclusion of female athletes with 
hyperandrogenism result in discriminatory policies against 
women. In Part I, this Note discusses the terms “sex,” 
“gender,” and “intersex.” Part II will explain the internal 
governance structure of the Olympic movement, including the 
relationship between the IOC and IAAF, as well as detail the 
various forms of sex testing used throughout history in sporting 
events by both organizations. Part II will also describe the recent 
sex testing guidelines developed by the IOC and IAAF. After 
outlining the history of sex testing in sports and identifying the 
current sex verification policy at issue in this Note, Part III will 
transition to a discussion of two separate sex discrimination suits 
brought by female athletes against Olympic governing bodies.17 
In light of the case law discussed in Part III, Part IV will assess 
the viability of a sex discrimination suit as a response to the IOC 
and IAAF’s inequitable policy on hyperandrogenism. Ultimately, 
this Note maintains that the current IOC and IAAF policy on 
hyperandrogenism facially discriminates against women and that 
litigation represents a viable vehicle for female athletes to voice 
their opposition.  
                                                          
14 Joanna Marchant, Women with High Male Hormone Levels Face Sport 
Ban, NATURE.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/ 
110414/full/news.2011.237.html. 
15 Shan Kohli, London 2012: IOC’s New Rules for Transgender Athletes 
Are Sexist, SPORTS LAW. (May 20, 2011), http://sportslawyer.in/london-
2012-ioc’s-new-rules-for-transgender-athletes-are-sexist. 
16 Id. 
17 Martin v. Int’l Olympics Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic 
Winter Games (2009), 98 B.C.L.R. 4th 109, para. 1 (Can. B.C.). 
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I. INTERSEXUALITY AND THE SEX-GENDER DISTINCTION 
A. Sex and Gender: What’s the Difference? 
Though colloquially the terms “sex” and “gender” are used 
interchangeably, this Note assumes a distinction between them, 
as is common practice in scholarly work examining the 
participation of intersex or transgender athletes in sports.18 Sex is 
a biological determination at birth19 and is generally defined 
according to one’s genitals, gonads, chromosomes, and 
hormones.20 While “[s]ex is about what your body includes[,] 
‘[g]ender,’ by contrast is about who you are.”21 Gender is 
dictated by self-perceptions about one’s identity22 and is 
understood by scholars as a “social construct.”23 Gender is 
related to sex in that it “refers to the social, cultural, or 
attitudinal qualities that are typically associated with a particular 
sex.”24 Simply, sex is a biological designation and gender is a 
personal and/or societal designation.25  
While one’s sex determines whether one is male or female, 
gender is determinative of masculinity or femininity.26 Though 
                                                          
18 See Jessica L. Adair, In a League of Their Own: The Case for Intersex 
Athletes, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 121, 124 (2011); Emily J. Cooper, Gender 
Testing in Athletic Competitions–Human Rights Violations: Why Michael 
Phelps is Praised and Caster Semenya is Chastised, 14 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 233, 237–38 (2010); Alice Dreger, Sex Typing for Sport, 40 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 22, 22 (2010); Seema Patel, Transsexuals in Sport: 
Inclusiveness and the Level Playing Field 2, available at 
http://www.anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/faculties/alss/deps/law/research/pape
rs_in_law_series.Maincontent.0004.file.tmp/Transsexuals%20in%20sport.pdf. 
19 Cooper, supra note 18, at 236; see also Patel, supra note 18. 
20 See SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED 
SELF 26 (2003). 
21 Dreger, supra note 18, at 22. 
22 Id. 
23 Cooper, supra note 18, at 237. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 236–37. 
26 Adair, supra note 18, at 124; Patel, supra note 18. Justice Scalia, in a 
dissenting opinion, discussed distinctions between sex and gender, noting 
that, “[t]he word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of 
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for many people being biologically male is linked to masculinity 
or being biologically female is linked to femininity,27 some 
individuals view themselves as masculine while simultaneously 
possessing biologically female characteristics or as feminine 
while possessing male characteristics.28 Recognizing the potential 
for and existence of masculine females and feminine males, the 
terms “sex” and “gender” will be used throughout this Note to 
refer to distinct concepts. 
                                                          
cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) 
distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to 
female and masculine to male.” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27 Cooper, supra note 18, at 238. 
28 See Dreger, supra note 18. In her article, The Five Sexes, Revisited, 
Anne Fausto-Sterling, a Brown University professor and biologist, argues that 
there are at least five sexes that should be recognized as “points in a 
multidimensional space.” Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, 40 
SCIENCES 18, 23 (2000) (explaining her theory on variation in sex); see also 
Haley K. Olsen-Acre, The Use of Drug Testing to Police Sex and Gender in 
the Olympic Games, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 207, 214 (2007) (discussing 
Anne Fausto-Sterling’s work). In addition to “male” and “female,” Fausto-
Sterling proposes the recognition of “‘herms’ (named after true 
hermaphrodites, people born with both a testis and an ovary); ‘merms’ (male 
pseudohermaphrodites, who are born with testes and some aspect of female 
genitalia); and ‘ferms’ (female pseudohermaphrodites, who have ovaries 
combined with some aspect of male genetalia).” Fausto-Sterling, supra, at 
19. 
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B. Defining Intersexuality29 
Individuals whose sex and gender identities do not align are 
collectively referred to as intersexuals.30 There are a “myriad of 
conditions”31 that comprise intersexuality, which the 
International Intersex Consensus Conference has termed 
Disorder(s) of Sex Development (“DSD”).32 
Intersexuality is, perhaps surprisingly, “a relatively common 
occurrence . . . it is estimated that approximately 1 in 2000 
children are born with ambiguous genitalia.”33 Current scientific 
standards deem any child with an “adequate” penis to be male.34 
“An ‘adequate’ penis is defined as ‘a penis capable of vaginal 
penetration and urination while standing.’”35 This classification 
presents an overly simplistic view of sex and highlights society’s 
general understanding of sex as binary.36 From birth, individuals 
                                                          
29 In addition to appreciating the difference between “sex” and “gender,” 
it is critical to realize another distinction, intersex from transsexual. While 
legal commentary on sex testing in sports frequently discusses the treatment 
of both transsexual and intersex individuals, these terms refer to different 
scientific and biological conditions. Transsexualism references “[t]he desire to 
change anatomic sexual characteristics to conform physically with one’s 
perception of oneself as a member of the opposite sex, coupled with a desire 
to live full-time in the role of the opposite sex.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 415,630 (27th ed. 2000). Intersexuals, meanwhile, are “people 
who, as individuals, are born with genetic, hormonal and physical features 
that may be thought to be typical of both male and female at once.” What is 
Intersex?, ORGANISATION INTERSEX INT’L USA, http://oiiusa.org/what_ 
is_intersex (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). This note will focus on policies 
governing the inclusion of intersex athletes. 
30 Megan Bell, Transsexuals and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1709, 
1718 (2004). 
31 Ritchie et al., supra note 2. 
32 Id. 
33 Peterson, supra note 8, at 319. 
34 Maura Kelly, Intersex: Sociologists for Women in Society Fact Sheet 1 
(2007), available at https://www.socwomen.org/web/images/stories/ 
resources/fact_sheets/fact_03-2007-intersex.pdf. 
35 Id. 
36 Adair, supra note 18, at 124. “In a world that tends to classify a 
person with either a male sex and gender or a female sex and gender, 
intersexuality can present problems immediately at birth.” Id. 
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are classified as either male or female.37 Rejecting this 
“either/or”38 designation, Anne Fausto-Sterling argues that sex 
exists on a spectrum, or as points in space.39 Sex is more fully 
defined by the following eight factors:  
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex—XY or XX; 
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)—testes or 
ovaries; 
3. Internal morphologic sex (determined after three 
months gestation)—seminal vesicles/prostrate [sic] or 
vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes; 
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia)—penis/scrotum or 
clitoris/labia; 
5. Hormonal sex—androgens or estrogens 
6. Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features)—facial and 
chest hair or breasts 
7. Assigned sex and gender rearing; and 
8. Sexual identity.40 
These factors frequently align so that one is either male or 
female; however, for intersex persons, determining sex on these 
indicators is decidedly less clear-cut.41 
Although by no means exhaustive, the following are common 
forms of intersexuality:  
1. Klinefelter Syndrome: Men with Klinefelter syndrome 
have an extra sex chromosome, such that their chromosal 
makeups are XXY, instead of the typical XY. “The 
syndrome is characterized by hypogonadism (small testes, 
azoospermia, oligospermia), gynecomastia in late 
puberty, psychosocial problems, hyalinization and 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 Olsen-Acre, supra note 28. 
39 See supra note 28. 
40 Cooper, supra note 18, at 238; see also Buzuvis, supra note 10, at 
37–38 (“Sex cannot be distilled to a single, determinable factor. Many 
biological and social factors—including chromosomes, hormones, genitals, 
gender identity and gender expression—contribute to our interpretation of 
whether an individual is male or female.”) 
41 Cooper, supra note 18, at 238. 
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fibrosis of the seminiferous tubules, and elevated urinary 
gonadotropin levels.”42 
2. Turner Syndrome: Individuals with this condition have 
one X chromosome but are missing one sex chromosome. 
Their genitalia, though female, is underdeveloped.43 
3. Swyer Syndrome: This condition is also known as pure 
gonadal dysgenesis. These individuals have an XY 
chromosomal makeup typical of males; however, they 
have a female genital appearance.44 
4. Persistent Mullerian Duct Syndrome: This is a “rare 
form of male pseudo-hermaphroditism characterized by 
the presence of Mullerian duct structures in an otherwise 
phenotypically, as well as genotypically, normal man.”45 
5. Hermaphroditism: True hermaphrodites typically have 
ambiguous external genitalia.46  
6. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (“AIS”): This is the 
most common form of male pseudohermaphroditism and 
is also known as testicular feminization. Though 
individuals with AIS are chromosomally and gonadally 
male, they lack an androgen receptor necessary to 
interact with the production of androgens, or male 
hormones.47 
7. 5-Alpha Reductase Deficiency: This condition is a 
form of male pseudohermaphroditism in which an 
individual appears to be externally female when young 
                                                          
42 Harold Chen, Klinefelter Syndrome, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/945649-overview (last updated July 
26, 2011). 
43 PREVES, supra note 20, at 30.  
44 Yang Han et al., Dysgerminoma in a Case of 46, XY Pure Gonadal 
Dysgenesis (Swyer Sydrome): A Case Report, 6 DIAGNOSTIC PATHOLOGY 84 
(2011). 
45 Nishikant N. Gujar et al., Male Form of Persistent Mullerian Duct 
Syndrome Type I (Hernia Uteri Inguinalis) Presenting as an Obstructed 
Inguinal Hernia: A Case Report, 5 J. MED. CASE REP. 586 (2011); see also 
Adair, supra note 18, at 126–27. 
46 PREVES, supra note 20. 
47 Id. at 27–28. 
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but after puberty becomes more male in appearance.48 
8. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: This condition is a 
form of female pseudohermaphroditism whereby an 
individual’s external organs develop in a typical male 
fashion yet the individual’s internal organs develop like a 
female.49 
While there are a variety of ways in which one can be 
intersexed, intersexed individuals do not necessarily consider 
themselves to be intersexual but often view themselves as either 
men or women.50 Within the realm of sports, Alice Dreger51 
notes that “[i]n practice, athletes show up with genders—as men 
or as women—and sex becomes an issue only if . . . an athlete 
competing as a woman is suspected of being ‘really’ 
male . . . .”52 Here, Dreger references the tradition of sex 
testing in the Olympics and the IOC’s standing to evaluate those 
“suspected” of being a sex distinct from the one he/she 
represents himself/herself to be.53 Through sex testing, the IOC 
thus can challenge an individual’s understanding of his or her 
sex.54 Given the IOC’s power to interfere with both how an 
individual perceives himself or herself, as well as an individual’s 
ability to compete in the Olympics, it is therefore critical that 
the IOC promulgates unbiased policies towards intersexed 
individuals. 
                                                          
48 Id. at 40. 
49 Id. at 27. 
50 Peterson, supra note 8, at 319. 
51 Alice Dreger is a Professor of Clinical Medical Humanities and 
Bioethics at the Feinberg School of Medicine at Northwestern University. 
About Me, ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, http://www.alicedreger.com/about. 
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
52 Dreger, supra note 18, at 22. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. 
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II. THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT: STRUCTURE AND SEX TESTING 
POLICIES 
A. Organization of the Olympics 
The Olympic Movement is comprised of the IOC, 
International Federations, and National Olympic Committees.55 
Within the IOC, there is a consultative Congress; a Session that 
issues final decisions; the EB, which oversees the ongoings of 
the IOC; and a President, who makes decisions when there is 
disagreement in the Session.56 The Olympic Charter outlines 
various duties of the IOC, most notably calling upon the 
organization to “act against any form of discrimination affecting 
the Olympic Movement; [t]o encourage and support the 
promotion of women in sport at all levels and in all structures 
with a view to implementing the principle of equality of men 
and women . . . [and] [t]o encourage and support the 
development of sport for all.”57  
Functionally, the IOC coordinates the efforts of National 
Olympic Committees (“NOCs”), International Sports 
Federations58 (“IFs”), Organising Committees for the 
Olympics Games (“OCOGs”), and athletes.59 In overseeing 
IFs, the IOC recognizes their ability to administer specific 
sports around the world.60 Additionally, IFs oversee 
developments and organize competitions in specific sports.61 
                                                          
55 Cooper, supra note 18, at 245. 
56 Id. 
57 The IOC: The Organisation, supra note 1. 
58 The IAAF, which worked with the IOC to develop a policy on 
hyperandrogenic women in Olympic competitions, is an IF. International 
Sports Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/content/The-
IOC/Governance/International-Federations/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012); 
International Association of Athletics Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, 
http://www.olympic.org/iaaf-athletics-road (last visited Feb. 17, 2012); IOC 
Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, supra note 
3. 
59 The IOC: The Organisation, supra note 1. 
60 International Sports Federations, supra note 58. 
61 Id. 
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IOC policies assist IFs in the governance of their respective 
sports.62  
Notably, the IOC has a distinct legal process for handling 
disputes that arise in connection with athletes at the Olympic 
Games.63 The IOC’s Olympic Charter mandates that parties 
arbitrate any dispute arising from the Olympic Games in 
accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.”64 In 
1984, the IOC established the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(“CAS”) and funded it to ensure that typical expenses associated 
with litigating in court would not burden athletes and other 
litigants.65 In this way, the IOC assures there is a forum for 
“increased disputes in international sports . . . .”66 
B. Historical Overview of Sex Testing 
Both the IAAF, the IF that regulates track and field events, 
and the IOC, which oversees IFs like the IAAF, have a 
substantial history of monitoring the sex of athletes at worldwide 
athletics events and the Olympics.67 In its original form, sex 
                                                          
62 See IAAF MED. & ANTI-DOPING COMM’N, IAAF POLICY ON GENDER 
VERIFICATION (2006), available at http://www.iaaf.org/mm/document/ 
imported/36983.pdf. 
63 Cooper, supra note 18, at 245.  
Although the IOC is an international, nongovernmental, not-for-
profit organization without the power to make law as such, it 
operates as part of an expansive and intricate network of regulatory 
bodies that make decision that very much affect athletes’ lives, as 
well as public perceptions of sport. IOC regulations have the force 
of law within the Games themselves. Within the Olympic Games, 
IOC decisions are final and can be appealed only to the IOC 
Executive Board or in some cases to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS).  
Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 210. 
64 Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter, r. 59, para. 1, at 104 
(Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic 
%20Charter/Charter_en_2010.pdf.  
65 Cooper, supra note 18, at 245–46. 
66 Id. at 246. 
67 Ross Tucker & Malcolm Collins, The Science and Management of Sex 
Verification in Sport, 21 S. AFRICAN J. SPORTS MED. 147, 150 (2009). 
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testing was aimed at ensuring that men did not disguise 
themselves and compete in women’s events to gain a competitive 
advantage.68 Despite this purported interest in maintaining a 
strict divide between men’s and women’s competitions, sex 
testing has never uncovered a case of an athlete disguising his or 
her sex.69 On the other hand, such testing has exposed female 
athletes with various forms of sex disorders often previously 
unknown to the competitors themselves.70 
The 1936 Olympics in Berlin marks the first instance of 
gender controversy in the Games.71 Stella Walsh and Helen 
Stephens, two female sprinters from the United States, were 
suspected of being men because of their masculine 
appearances.72 Walsh was even given the nickname “Stella the 
Fella” by the press.73 Following the 100-meter sprint, where 
Stephens beat Walsh by 0.2 seconds, Walsh accused Stephens of 
being a man.74 Upon Walsh’s death in 1980, it was revealed via 
an autopsy that Walsh had atypical sex chromosomes and 
ambiguous genitalia.75 Additionally, the 1936 Olympics marks 
the only known instance of a male masquerading as a female for 
competitive purposes.76 Hermann Ratjen, an Olympic high 
jumper, bound his genitals in order to participate in the women’s 
competition.77 Interestingly, Ratjen placed fourth behind three 
women.78 
The purported impetus behind the introduction of formal sex 
testing in international athletic organizations was the string of 
                                                          
68 Adair, supra note 18, at 132 (“Predicated on the belief that men and 
women should compete separately, administrators of athletic competitions 
historically sought to prevent people from infiltrating the other sex’s division 
in order to gain a competitive advantage.”). 
69 Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 398. 
70 Id. 





76 Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 212. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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eight other female competitors between 1932 and 1968 who 
were accused of being men.79 In 1966, the IAAF required all 
female participants at the European Track and Field 
Championships to pass a “femininity” test to be eligible for 
competition.80 The test consisted of a physical inspection of an 
athlete’s genitalia.81 In 1967, however, the IAAF introduced a 
new form of sex testing—the chromatin analysis.82 The 
chromatin method involves a “buccal smear,” or a cheek swab, 
taken from athletes to test for the presence of the Barr body, 
which is found only in females.83 In light of the IAAF’s 
developments, in 1968 the IOC instituted the chromatin testing 
at the Mexico City Summer Olympic Games.84 The IOC 
reasoned that such testing was less invasive than physical 
inspections; nevertheless, the use of chromosomes to determine 
sex is still flawed given the numerous chromosome combinations 
discussed in Part I Section B of this Note.85 
Ewa Klobukowska, an Olympian and co-world record holder 
for the 100-meter sprint, was the first athlete disqualified as a 
result of sex testing.86 In 1967, Klobukowska failed her 
chromatin analysis at the European Cup Track and Field events 
in Kiev and consequently was permanently disqualified from 
future events and stripped of her records.87 The IOC even went 
so far as to rescind her medals from the 1960 Olympics.88 
Klobukowska not only suffered embarrassment within the IAAF 
but also endured derision from the popular media.89 After 
                                                          
79 Peterson, supra note 8, at 320. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 321. 
82 Id. 
83 Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 397. 
84 Peterson, supra note 8, at 321. 
85 Id. 
86 Cheryl L. Cole, One Chromosome Too Many?, in THE OLYMPICS AT 
THE MILLENNIUM: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE GAMES 128, 129 (Kay 
Schaffer & Sidonie Smith eds., 2000). It is thought that Klobukowska had 
XX/XXY mosaicism. Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 397. 
87 Peterson, supra note 8, at 322. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
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Klobukowska was essentially turned into a public spectacle 
following the sex test failure, the IOC and IAAF recommended 
that athletes similarly situated should withdraw from 
competitions, citing a warm-up injury, to avoid the media 
frenzy.90  
In 1992, yet another form of sex testing was introduced at 
the Albertville Winter Olympics—the test involved a 
“polymerase chain reaction (PCR) determination of the absence 
or presence of DNA sequences from the testes-determining gene 
located on the Y chromosome.”91 This test, however, was flawed 
since at least one of the DNA sequences used in the PCR was 
not restricted to males.92 Moreover, both the buccal smear test 
and the PCR test are inadequate because they “do not consider 
hormonal levels, physical appearance . . . or any other of the 
many factors that can be said to contribute to a person’s 
sex . . . .”93 
The 1996 Atlanta Games evidenced a shift in the IOC’s 
policy on the participation of intersex athletes.94 Though the IOC 
tested over 3,000 women at the Atlanta Games and eight women 
failed the test, it did not disqualify nor require the withdrawal of 
any athletes from competition.95 Some scholars have speculated 
that the case of Maria Jose Martinez Patino, a Spanish hurdler, 
changed the IOC’s outlook towards intersex athletes.96 After 
Patino was ruled ineligible to compete at the 1985 University 
Games in Japan,97 she was diagnosed with AIS.98 Though the 
                                                          
90 Id.  
91 JC Reeser, Gender Identity and Sport: Is the Playing Field Level?, 39 
BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 695, 696 (2005). 
92 Id. 
93 Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 217 (“Because the buccal smear and 
polymerase chain reaction tests identify only chromosomal sex, they can 
declare athletes to be a sex that the athletes themselves have never identified 
as.”).  
94 Peterson, supra note 8, at 322. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Michael D. Lemonick, Genetic Tests Under Fire, TIME (Feb. 24, 
1992), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974937,00.html. 
98 Cole, supra note 86, at 138. See supra Part I.B. for a further 
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Spanish Athletic Federation removed her name from record 
books, Patino vigilantly fought to reassume her status as a 
woman in athletics.99 “Armed with the knowledge that because 
of her androgen insensitivity she was unable to respond to 
testosterone and was ‘unquestionably female and chromosomally 
XY,’ Patino managed to be reinstated by the IAAF.”100 In 1991, 
the IAAF discontinued its use of the chromatin analysis,101 
returning to an earlier method where doctors observed athletes’ 
genitals during a routine physical examination.102 The IOC, 
however, continued to utilize chromosome testing until 1999.103 
Though the IOC moved away from compulsory sex testing,104 
to this day it retains the right to test athletes on an individual 
basis who are suspected of being a biological sex that differs 
from his or her gender.105 After the 2006 Asia Games, Santhi 
Soundarajan, an Indian runner, was stripped of her silver medal 
for failing her sex test.106 Following the sex test, Soundarajan 
was diagnosed with AIS.107 Rumors soon circulated that 
Soundarajan attempted to commit suicide after discovering the 
results of the sex test.108 No longer a competitor herself, 
Soundarajan now coaches hopeful athletes at a sports academy 
                                                          
explanation of androgen insensitivity syndrome. 
99 Peterson, supra note 8, at 323. 
100 Id. 
101 Stacy Larson, Comment, Intersexuality and Gender Verification Tests: 
The Need to Assure Human Rights and Privacy, 23 PACE INT’L L. REV. 215, 
232 (2011). 
102 Lemonick, supra note 97. 
103 Peterson, supra note 8, at 323. 
104 This decision of the IOC was supported by Yale physician and 
professor Myron Genel “who stated that the tests are difficult to perform, 
have the potential for error, and are discriminatory towards women.” Larson, 
supra note 101, at 233. 
105 Peterson, supra note 8, at 323. 
106 Buzuvis, supra note 10, at 36. 
107 Nilanjana Bhowmick & Jyoti Thottam, Gender and Athletics: India’s 
Own Caster Semenya, TIME (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/ 
world/article/0,8599,1919562,00.html. See supra Part I.B for an explanation 
of AIS. 
108 Id.  
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for underprivileged children.109 Soundarajan continues to 
consider herself a woman; in fact, her birth certificate indicates 
that she is female.110 Soundarajan’s painful and public experience 
further highlights the problematic nature of the use of sex testing 
in determining eligibility for competition, particularly for 
intersex individuals. 
The most recent controversy over an athlete’s sex is the case 
of Caster Semenya.111 In 2009, at the Track and Field World 
Championship, Caster Semenya, a South African athlete, beat 
the defending world champion in the 800-meter competition by 
2.45 seconds.112 Rumors that Semenya was not, in fact, a woman 
quickly eclipsed the excitement surrounding her impressive 
performance.113 Semenya’s fellow competitors openly doubted 
her eligibility for women’s competitions given her masculine 
appearance and record-shattering performance.114 In response to 
public rumblings over Semenya’s questionable womanhood, the 
IAAF asked that Semenya submit to sex testing to confirm her 
eligibility for competition in the women’s division.115 The results 
from Semenya’s sex test were never publicly released,116 in 
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 Harmeet Shah Singh, India Athlete Makes Plea for Semenya, CNN 
(Sept. 14, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-14/world/Semenya.India. 
Athlete_1_gender-test-suicide-attempt-caster-semenya. 
111 Peterson, supra note 8, at 315. 
112 Id. 
113 David Epstein, IAAF Has No Reason to Disqualify 800-Meter 
Champion Semenya, SI.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
com/2009/writers/david_epstein/08/21/semenya/index.html. 
114 Peterson, supra note 8, at 315. 
115 Epstein, supra note 113. 
116 Peterson, supra note 8, at 316. In September 2009, the Australian Daily 
Telegraph reported that the results of the sex test revealed that Semenya had 
female external genitalia but internal testes. Mike Hurst, Caster Semenya Has 
Male Sex Organs and No Womb or Ovaries, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 
2009), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/sport/semenya-has-no-womb-or-
ovaries/story-e6frexni-1225771672245. The IAAF never confirmed these 
reports, instead declaring that they were not official IAAF statements. 
Peterson, supra note 8, at 316. Despite this, the results reprinted in the 
Australian Daily Telegraph were reprinted in several other publications. Id.; 
see also Hurst, supra. 
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keeping with the IAAF’s policy on privacy rights of athletes.117 
While Semenya was permitted to keep her prize money, gold 
medal, and World Champion title, her ability to compete in 
future events in the women’s division remained uncertain.118 
Moreover, Semenya herself struggled to recover from harsh 
public skepticism about her sex, and she reportedly went “into 
hiding due to the distress and embarrassment generated by the 
controversy.”119 Semenya’s story illustrates the delicate balance 
the IOC must strike in achieving fairness in the Games as well 
as the serious consequences sex testing practices may have on 
the reputations and livelihoods of individual athletes. 
C. Current Sex Verification Policy 
While the IOC has yet to release a finalized policy that will 
dictate the eligibility of intersexual athletes for the 2012 
Olympic Games in London, in April of 2011 it did release a 
series of principles that will likely dictate the formulation of 
such a policy.120 The principles are guided in large part by the 
conclusions of two different conferences convened in 2010.121 
The January 2010 meeting, organized by both the IOC Medical 
Commission and the IAAF, sought to address the scientific 
implications of female athletes with hyperandrogenism 
competing on the Olympic level.122 The meeting was arguably 
                                                          
117 Peterson, supra note 8, at 316. 
118 Id. Later, the IAAF decided that Semenya would be eligible to 
compete in future events. Buzuvis, supra note 10, at 36. 
119 Buzuvis, supra note 10, at 36. 
120 Kohli, supra note 15. The principles were released following a two-
day meeting of the EB to discuss the issue of female athletes with 
hyperandrogenism. The IOC stated that it would formalize rules based on the 
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prompted by the controversy over Semenya’s sex at the 2009 
World Championships in Berlin.123 Following Semenya’s stellar 
performance, some athletes questioned the fairness of her ability 
to compete as a woman in light of her masculine features.124  
While conference members generally agreed that they should 
promulgate specific rules addressing female athletes with 
hyperandrogenism, they gave no indication that they had decided 
the substance of those rules.125 They did, however, reach two 
general conclusions: (1) “in order to protect the health of the 
athlete, sports authorities should have the responsibility to make 
sure that any case of female hyperandrogenism that arises under 
their jurisdiction receives adequate medical follow-up” and (2) 
“rules need to be put in place to regulate the participation of 
athletes with hyperandrogenism in competitions for women.”126 
Furthering this concern for athlete health, conference members 
advised that the IOC create “medical ‘centers of 
excellence’ . . . to diagnose sex-development disorders.”127 The 
IOC Medical Commission Chairman Arne Ljungqvist justified 
the creation of such centers on the grounds that not every 
country with Olympic athletes would have the requisite 
resources to identify and treat intersex athletes.128 Constructing 
“strategically located centers” would allow athletes to be tested 
by qualified experts in an efficient and expedient manner, 
Ljungqvist explained.129 Another idea discussed at the conference 
involved requiring all athletes to undergo a medical examination 
prior to competition.130 
                                                          
123 Kolata, supra note 121. For further discussion of the controversy over 
Caster Semenya’s sex, see supra Part II.B. 
124 Kolata, supra note 121.  
125 Id. 
126 IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, 
supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
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129 Id.  
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The IOC Medical Commission organized a second 
conference in October 2010 to further discuss the treatment of 
athletes with hyperandrogenism.131 The conference consisted of 
scientists, sports administrators, sports lawyers, human rights 
experts, female athletes, experts in medical and sports ethics, 
and a representative from Organisation Intersex International.132 
The conference further emphasized the need for clear-cut rules 
that would “respect the essence of the male/female classification 
and also guarantee the fairness and integrity of female 
competitions for all female athletes.”133 
Drawing upon the conclusions reached by these two panels, 
the IOC Medical Commission recommended a set of principles 
to assist in the development of rules governing the participation 
of intersex athletes.134 The principles are as follows: 
(1) A female recognised in law should be eligible to 
compete in female competitions provided that she has 
androgen levels below the male range (as shown by the 
serum concentration of testosterone) or, if within the 
male range, she has androgen resistance such that she 
derives no competitive advantage from such levels. 
(2) An evaluation with respect to eligibility should be made 
on an anonymous basis by a panel of independent 
international experts in the field of hyperandrogenism that 
would in each case issue a recommendation on eligibility for 
the sport concerned. In each case, the sport would decide on 
an athlete’s eligibility taking into consideration the panel’s 
recommendation. Should an athlete be considered ineligible 
to compete, she would be notified of the reasons why, and 
informed of the conditions she would be required to meet 
should she wish to become eligible again. 
                                                          
131 IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, 
supra note 3. 
132 Id. The Organisation Intersex International representative was Hida 
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(3) If an athlete refuses to comply with any aspect of the 
eligibility determination process, while that is her right as 
an individual, she will not be eligible to participate as a 
competitor in the chosen sport. 
(4) The investigation of a particular case should be 
conducted under strict confidentiality. Although rare, 
some women develop male-like body characteristics due 
to an overproduction of male sex hormones, so-called 
“androgens.” The androgenic effects on the human body 
explain why men perform better than women in most 
sports and are, in fact, the very reason for the distinction 
between male and female in competition in most sports. 
Consequently, women with hyperandrogenism generally 
perform better in sport than other women.135 
Ljungqvist noted that an athlete would only be investigated if 
she herself sought out medical officials for an evaluation, if she 
displayed male characteristics during drug testing, or if she had 
abnormal hormone levels.136 At the same time, Ljungqvist 
stressed that an athlete would not be subject to testing due to 
accusations of other athletes that the individual was not a 
woman.137 
Once the rules are finalized, the EB of the IOC noted that it 
would encourage IFs to adopt similar rules for use in their 
competitions, “duly adapted to meet the specificities of the sport 
concerned.”138 In April 2011, the IAAF adopted rules that 
closely mirror the principles outlined by the IOC Medical 
Commission, becoming the first international sports federation to 
do so.139 The rules were approved by the IAAF at its meeting in 
Daegu, South Korea—the host of the 2011 world 
championships—and went into effect May 1, 2011.140 
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III. MARTIN AND SAGEN: THE LEGACY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
LAWSUITS AGAINST OLYMPIC POLICIES 
If formally adopted by the IOC prior to the 2012 Summer 
Olympics in London, this policy on hyperandrogenism will 
likely preclude some female athletes from participation. Female 
athletes with androgen levels within the “male range” whose 
bodies do not have an androgen resistance will be considered 
ineligible for competition in women’s events.141 Such a policy is 
discriminatory on its face because it is silent on the issue of 
what constitutes an acceptable level of androgen for men 
competing in men’s events.142 For instance, the intersex 
condition Diplo (XYY) causes men to produce higher levels of 
testosterone than other men, yet the IOC policy does not 
disqualify men with Diplo from competitions.143  
Recognizing this inequity, female competitors must find 
appropriate methods to challenge this biased policy, such as 
using litigation to attack the discrimination. This Part discusses 
two lawsuits that female athletes have brought against the IOC, 
and/or relevant organizing committees in host countries, alleging 
sex discrimination in the administration of the Games; namely, 
Martin v. International Olympics Committee and Sagen v. 
Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Winter Games.144 Though the groups of women in 
both cases were ultimately unsuccessful in their suits, those 
                                                          
141 IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, 
supra note 3. 
142 See Hida Viloria, Opinion: Gender Rules in Sport–Leveling the 




144 Though Jennifer Ann Cleary argues in her Note that these two cases 
illustrate the inability of litigation to address gender discrimination in the 
Olympics, this Note maintains that the cases serve as useful vehicles for 
shaping a gender discrimination claim in regards to the androgen policy and 
that such a claim is in fact stronger than those in Martin and Sagen. See 
Jennifer Ann Cleary, A Need to Realign the Modern Games with the Modern 
Times: The International Olympic Committee’s Commitment to Fairness, 
Equality, and Sex Discrimination, 61 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1285 (2011). 
566 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
cases are distinguishable from a hypothetical case challenging 
the latest intersex policy. The cases provide important insight 
into how women can assert successful claims that the 
hyperandrogenism policy is discriminatory on the basis of sex. 
A. Martin v. International Olympics Committee 
In Martin v. International Olympics Committee, women 
runners argued that a decision, and the rule used to implement 
it, was discriminatory. Martin illustrates the potential pitfalls 
female plaintiffs may encounter when they bring a sex 
discrimination claim against various Olympics bodies in U.S. 
courts. In particular, if the challenged rule is deemed gender-
neutral, the claim is less likely to succeed. 
On August 15, 1983, a group of women runners filed a 
complaint145 against the IOC, United States Olympic Committee 
(“USOC”), Athletic Congress of the United States (“TAC”) and 
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (“LAOOC”) 
alleging that the defendants discriminated in the administration 
of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games by failing to include 
the 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter women’s track races.146 The 
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and requested a 
writ of mandate from the court directing the defendants to 
institute women’s 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter track races.147 
The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the defendants had violated 
their right to the equal protection of law under the Fifth148 and 
                                                          
145 Though the complaint was originally filed by the plaintiffs in Los 
Angeles Superior Court, it was later removed by the defendants to the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California. Martin v. Int’l 
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Fourteenth149 Amendments to the United States (“U.S.”) 
Constitution.150 
The court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs failed to 
show a fair chance of success on the merits regarding their 
federal constitutional claims.151 Though the plaintiffs argued that 
the court should apply the test for sex discrimination utilized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren—
classifications based on gender “must serve important 
governmental objectives” and be “substantially related” to those 
objectives152—the court declined to apply that test because it 
found that Rule 32 was gender-neutral.153 Rule 32 of the 1970 
Olympic Charter governs the addition of events to the Olympic 
Program.154 Under the rule, “a men’s sport may be added to the 
Olympic Program if it is widely practiced in at least forty 
                                                          
from invidiously discriminating between groups or individuals.” Martin, 1984 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *22 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
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only to states. Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *22. It states, in 
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have engaged in state action. Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *24. 
The court relied upon a state action test announced in Burton v. Wilmington 
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Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). 
150 Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *21. The plaintiffs also 
brought state law claims against the defendants under the California 
Constitution and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Id. at *41–43. The Unruh Civil 
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California. California Department of Fair Employment & Housing Fact Sheet, 
http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/res/docs/publications/DFEH-250.pdf (last visited 
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151 Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *41. A plaintiff must 
demonstrate a “likelihood of success on the merits” of his or her claim to be 
awarded injunctive relief. Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008) 
(quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 428 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
153 Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *27. 
154 Id. at *4, 10–11.  
568 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
countries on three continents,” for the Summer Olympics, “and 
at least twenty-five countries on two continents” for the Winter 
Olympics.155 For women’s events, the sport must be “widely 
practiced in twenty-five countries and two continents” for the 
Summer Olympics and “twenty countries and two continents” 
for the Winter Olympics.156 
The plaintiffs then argued that the rule had a disproportionate 
impact on women; however, the court noted that a 
“disproportionate impact must be traceable to an invidiously 
discriminatory purpose.”157 The court found no invidiously 
discriminatory purpose behind Rule 32 because, statistically, the 
number of female competitors in the Games has almost tripled 
since 1948;158 forty-eight women’s events have been added to the 
Games since 1949;159 “no new opportunities intended only for 
male competitors have been added as exceptions to normal rules 
and procedures”;160 and the plaintiffs produced no “statements 
made by persons involved in the decision,” which would 
illustrate a discriminatory purpose.161 Thus, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the rule was discriminatory on the 
basis of gender.162  
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157 Id. at *28 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–44 (1976); 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979)). In Feeney, the 
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After the district court denied the plaintiffs’ requested 
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.163 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
though “the women runners made a strong showing that the 
early history of the modern Olympic Games was marred by 
blatant discrimination against women . . . women’s participation 
in the Olympics had increased markedly during the past thirty-
six years.”164 The plaintiffs challenged the decision of the district 
judge on several grounds; specifically, they argued that the 
district judge had incorrectly concluded that Rule 32 was facially 
gender-neutral165 and that the district judge should have shifted 
the burden of proof to the defendants after they presented ample 
evidence of historical discrimination in the Olympic Games.166 
Addressing these arguments in turn, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs’ argument that the Rule was not facially neutral 
because “[R]ule 32 undeniably applies to both men and women 
athletes as it established criteria for adding all new events to the 
Olympic program.”167 In response to the plaintiffs’ second 
argument, the Ninth Circuit noted that a historical background 
of discrimination in the Olympics “is insufficient alone to create 
a presumption of purposeful discrimination or to shift the burden 
of showing discriminatory intent behind this facially neutral 
regulation.”168 Thus, under its “very limited” scope of review,169 
the court found that the district judge had applied a proper legal 
analysis and affirmed the decision.170 Acknowledging its 
restricted ability to review the district court’s decision, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that its review on appeal “may provide little 
guidance as to the appropriate disposition [of the case] on the 
                                                          
163 Martin v. Int’l Olympics Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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165 Id. at 678. 
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168 Id. at 679. 
169 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the opinion of the district court for abuse 
of discretion, or a “clear error of judgment.” Id. (citing Sports Form, Inc. v. 
United Press Int’l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
170 Id. 
570 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
merits.”171 This disclaimer evidences the possibility for a 
different outcome had the Ninth Circuit possessed a broader 
scope of review.  
B. Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games 
Years after the plaintiffs in Martin charged that the absence 
of the women’s 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter track event was 
discriminatory, in 2008 a group of female ski jumpers brought 
suit in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, making similar 
claims about the exclusion of women’s ski jumping from the 
Olympic Program.172 Sagen evidences the difficulty with naming 
defendants in gender discrimination suits concerning the 
Olympics. Courts are wary of applying national law to 
international organizations yet are reticent to hold national 
committees entirely responsible for the implementation of 
policies guided by those international organizations. The women 
here claimed that the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 
2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games (“VANOC”) had violated 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.173 They argued 
that VANOC’s decision to hold men’s ski jumping events and 
not women’s ski jumping events violated Section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter,174 which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex and other protected classes.175 
In analyzing the claim of the female ski jumpers, the court 
outlined three issues: (1) does the Canadian Charter apply to 
VANOC, (2) if so, did VANOC breach Section 15 by failing to 
host women’s ski jumping, and (3) is an infringement under 
                                                          
171 Id. (citing Sports Form, Inc., 686 F.2d at 753). 
172 Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic 
Winter Games (2009), 98 B.C.L.R. 4th 109, para. 1 (Can. B.C.); Cleary, 
supra note 144, at 1296.  
173 Cleary, supra note 172, at 1297 (“The Canadian Charter is Canada’s 
Bill of Rights and comprises the first part of the Canadian Constitution.”). 
174 Id. 
175 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 15 (U.K.), 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Charter/CHART_E.PDF. 
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Section 15 negated by Section 1 of the Canadian Charter?176 In 
response to the first issue, the court found that, though VANOC 
is a “private entity,”177 the Canadian Charter applied to VANOC 
because it engaged in a “government activity”178 by “planning, 
organizing, financing, and staging the 2010 Games.”179  
In addressing the second issue, the court utilized a two-part 
test to ascertain whether there was discrimination under § 15(1) 
of the Canadian Charter: “(1) Does the law create a distinction 
based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the 
distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or 
stereotyping?”180 Interestingly, the court looked to Martin to 
evaluate sex discrimination.181 The court critiqued the Martin 
court’s determination that Rule 32 was gender-neutral, noting 
that 
[t]he majority in Martin did not go beyond formal 
distinctions to consider adverse effects [of] 
discrimination, in particular, whether the application of 
rules neutral on their face result in the unequal treatment 
of women who compete in events that are already 
included in the Olympics for men but not for women.182  
Thus, the court rejected Martin’s narrower outlook on sex 
discrimination and found, using its two-pronged test, that (1) the 
female ski jumpers were being “treated less favourably” as 
compared to male ski jumpers183 and (2) “the Olympic Charter 
Rules that grandfather men’s ski jumping, while requiring 
women’s ski jumping events to meet the criteria for inclusion of 
new events” was discriminatory.184  
Despite its finding of discrimination, the court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ suit was not brought against the IOC, who 
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promulgated the rules, but rather brought against VANOC, the 
organization that implemented the rules.185 The court explained 
that the IOC was not a party to the suit because it was not 
subject to the Canadian Charter as a Swiss organization.186 
Though the plaintiffs attempted to argue that VANOC’s 
implementation of IOC policy was discriminatory, the court 
noted that VANOC had no authority to select which events 
would be staged at the Olympics.187 Rather, the IOC and IFs 
have authority over Olympic events.188 Ultimately, the court 
found that since “VANOC did not make the decision to exclude 
women’s ski jumping from the 2010 Games[,]” VANOC did not 
violate the Canadian Charter.189  
IV. HYPOTHETICAL SEX DISCRIMINATION SUIT CHALLENGING 
INTERSEX POLICY 
Though the plaintiffs in both Martin and Sagen were 
ultimately unsuccessful in their lawsuits charging discriminatory 
practices at the Olympics, both cases could inform the 
formulation of a potential lawsuit brought by female athletes 
challenging the IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism. 
Even though the cases are from different countries, the 
Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon’s analysis in Sagen engages 
with the Martin court’s reasoning, which evidences a willingness 
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of courts to look beyond their jurisdictions when evaluating sex 
discrimination claims against an international player such as the 
IOC.190 More broadly, U.S., Canadian, and British law “fall 
within the scope of a single, common legal tradition” 
characterized by legal borrowing.191 “Legal borrowing” implies a 
willingness among these countries to, explicitly or implicitly, 
share jurisprudence.192 While Vincent-Joël Proulx analyzes “legal 
borrowing” within the framework of trademark law, the concept 
has the potential for other applications, particularly when the 
body of law is susceptible to an international exchange and 
involves international players.193 
This section outlines the structure of a potential lawsuit and 
assesses its likelihood of success. After first addressing the 
proper venue and parties for such a case, this section then turns 
to the claim itself and considers what an argument of sex 
discrimination should look like. Ultimately, this Note concludes 
that a sex discrimination suit against the IOC/IAAF 
hyperandrogenism policy would be more successful than either 
Martin or Sagen because of the ability to hold the London 
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (“LOCOG”) 
directly responsible for supporting a facially discriminatory 
policy.  
A. Where: British Law on Sex Discrimination 
Assuming arguendo that the IOC were to finalize its policy 
on hyperandrogenism prior to the 2012 Summer Olympics in 
London—which is likely, as it was adopted by the IAAF194—a 
sex discrimination suit would necessarily be brought in Britain.195 
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Recall that in Martin, the plaintiffs brought suit in state court in 
California,196 charging that the absence of certain women’s 
events at the Los Angeles Olympics was discriminatory.197 Later, 
the plaintiffs in Sagen litigated their claim concerning the 
Vancouver Olympics in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia.198 Additionally, the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
would not have jurisdiction over this suit because there is not a 
“specific agreement” between the female athletes and the 
London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games.199 Despite 
the outcomes of both Martin and Sagen, plaintiffs seeking to 
challenge the implementation of the intersex policy at the 
London Games would be advised to bring suit in England, the 
country in which the Games will be staged, to ensure proper 
venue over the LOCOG. 
A claim against various Olympic entities in Britain would 
most likely be brought under that country’s new Equality Act, 
passed in 2010.200 The law was aimed at synthesizing nine major 
pieces legislation201 into a single, cohesive “legal framework” 
guaranteeing equality.202 Despite the unification under the 
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Equality Act, the relevant sex discrimination law is still 
contained within the text of the Sex Discrimination Act (“SDA”) 
of 1975.203 The SDA prohibits both direct and indirect204 
discrimination on the basis of sex in the realm of “goods, 
facilities and services.”205 Notably, there is an exception for 
sports, as the SDA permits separation of the sexes within sports 
“where the physical strength, stamina or physique of the average 
woman puts her at a disadvantage to the average man . . . .”206 
Moreover, the Equality Act states that “[s]ex discrimination is 
lawful in certain circumstances when selecting participants for 
sports and other events of a competitive nature where activities 
are confined to competitors of one sex.”207 The language of the 
SDA, and other laws encompassed within the Equality Act, 
suggests that British law tolerates separate events for different 
sexes based on physical differences between men and women; 
however, a lawsuit challenging the IOC and IAAF policy on 
hyperandrogenism would not object to the existence of separate 
men’s and women’s divisions in Olympic competition, but rather 
how the Olympic bodies would regulate who counts as a woman. 
Simply, the discrimination here is the arbitrary definition of 
woman and the consequences of excluding from competition 
athletes who consider themselves women. 
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B. Who: Determining Defendants in a Sex Discrimination 
Suit 
Once deciding where to litigate their claim, hypothetical 
plaintiffs would then identify the relevant defendants. Recall that 
in Martin, the plaintiffs sued the IOC in addition to U.S. 
Olympic governing bodies.208 In Sagen, however, the plaintiffs 
did not join the IOC as a defendant.209 Jennifer Anne Cleary, in 
her Note A Need to Align the Modern Games with Modern 
Times: the International Olympic Committee’s Commitment to 
Fairness, Equality, and Sex Discrimination, suggests that the 
plaintiffs in Sagen did not join the IOC because of the outcome 
of Martin and “the history of deference to the IOC’s 
decisions.”210 Admittedly, in both Martin and Sagen the courts 
may have been reticent to demand that an international 
organization alter the Olympic program.211  
Respect for the IOC’s authority, on the other hand, did not 
control the outcome of those cases. Although they joined the 
IOC as defendants, the plaintiffs in Martin were unsuccessful 
because the court found that Rule 32 was not discriminatory on 
its face.212 The plaintiffs in Sagen lost because they did not bring 
suit against the IOC, which was responsible for determining the 
Olympic program.213 The Sagen plaintiffs, who brought their 
claim in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, did not join the 
IOC because it was not subject to the Canadian Charter.214 Thus, 
the plaintiffs in Sagen were out of luck—they could not sue the 
IOC because of lack of jurisdiction, but could not assert a 
successful claim against VANOC because it did not control the 
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Olympic program.215 The Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon, 
however, left open the possibility that there exist “exceptions to 
the general principle” that VANOC could not be held responsible 
for the discriminatory policy because it did not create it.216 
A sex discrimination suit against the hyperandrogenism 
policy should fall within the exception noted by the Honourable 
Madam Justice Fenlon. Just as the court in Sagen looked to 
Martin to influence its decision, the hypothetical court here 
should incorporate analyses from Sagen and Martin into its own 
decision. Here, the plaintiffs’ success hinges on whether they 
are able to show that the implementing entity—in this case 
LOCOG—is so supportive of the discriminatory policy that it 
should itself be held accountable for it. In Sagen, it was 
important to the Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon’s decision 
that VANOC had expressed its support for the female athletes; 
she wrote that VANOC “remains ready and willing to host [a 
women’s ski jumping] event should the IOC change its 
decision.”217 It was difficult to hold VANOC responsible for 
enforcing the IOC’s discriminatory decision when VANOC had 
clearly demonstrated its backing of the female ski jumpers.218 
Here, however, more support exists for the hyperandrogenism 
policy than for the female athletes. Not only has the IAAF 
adopted the policy219 but LOCOG has essentially ratified it by 
recognizing that the final IOC policy on hyperandrogenism will 
govern at the 2012 Olympic Games.220 As LOCOG supports the 
IOC policy on hyperandrogenism, or at least does not outwardly 
object to it as VANOC did in Sagen, the hypothetical plaintiffs 
here would have a stronger case against LOCOG than the 
plaintiffs in Sagen had against VANOC. Thus, the Sagen 
dilemma of lack of jurisdiction over the IOC is avoided since the 
local organizing committee itself can be named as a defendant. 
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C. What: The Sex Discrimination Claim 
The IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism is facially 
discriminatory because the policy only regulates androgen levels 
in women, not men.221 The principles put forth by the IOC 
explicitly require “female[s]” in “female competitions” to have 
“androgen levels below the male range,” but the policy is silent 
on what the threshold for the male range is, or if there is an 
androgen limit for males in male competitions.222 In this vein, 
Hida Viloria, the Human Rights Spokesperson for the 
Organisation Intersex International,223 argues that “many athletes 
have conditions that give them physical advantages, 
and . . . seeking to remove the advantages of only women with 
hyperandrogenism is discriminatory.”224 Viloria cites to the 
“intersex variation Diplo,” which causes men to produce higher 
levels of testosterone, and points out, “no one is insisting that 
[men with Diplo] lower their testosterone levels to the ‘normal’ 
male level.”225  
Furthermore, the hyperandrogenism policy is overly 
simplistic because it assumes there exists a “normal” level of 
androgens in females.226 Dr. Eric Vilain, a professor of human 
genetics, pediatrics and urology at the University of California 
Los Angeles’ David Geffen School of Medicine and participant 
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in the January 2010 IOC panel on hyperandrogenism, noted that 
“there is a tremendous variation in hormone levels even in 
typical females, which makes determining a baseline virtually 
impossible.”227 Additionally, Alice Dreger argues that female 
athletes are “likely to have naturally high levels of androgens. 
That is probably part of why [they] succeed[] athletically.”228 
Thus, the IOC’s hyperandrogenism policy is not only 
discriminatory because it focuses solely on women, but it also 
rests on flawed logic because it incorrectly assumes that science 
is capable of quantifying a “normal” level of androgens in 
women. 
The IOC and IAAF policy unfairly targets women with 
hyperandrogenism on the basis of maintaining a level playing 
field for other female athletes;229 however, this rationale is 
defective because it does not account for the failure of these 
organizations to regulate other factors that affect athletes’ 
competitive advantages. For instance, Alice Dreger points out 
that men tend to be taller than women; however, no sporting 
body attempts to bar from competition women who are a “male-
typical height . . . .”230 Indeed, “sports are inherently unequal 
regardless of genetics . . . and any potential athletic advantages 
one might have because of a DSD are no different from other 
naturally occurring physical advantage like being taller or having 
more balance.”231 Furthermore, it is unclear whether increased 
androgens actually translate into a competitive advantage.232 
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Clearly, the IOC and IAAF’s purported interest in maintaining a 
level playing field through the strict separation of sexes fails to 
justify the implementation of an arbitrary hyperandrogenism 
policy that unfairly discriminates against women.  
CONCLUSION 
The IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism plainly 
conflicts with the sentiment of equality of the sexes within the 
Olympic Charter. While a sex discrimination suit against 
LOCOG is not the only means to challenge the 
hyperandrogenism policy, it represents an effective avenue for 
addressing the inequity presented by the regulation of androgen 
levels in women. Certainly, a lawsuit involving female athletes 
and Olympic organizing bodies would draw international media 
attention and highlight the unfair practice of sex testing. Female 
athletes looking to dispute the policy’s implementation at the 
Summer Olympic Games in London would likely have more 
success than the plaintiffs in Martin and Sagen because of the 
importance placed on sex equality in British law, the ability to 
hold LOCOG responsible for the policy, and the recognition that 
the policy represents outright discrimination against women. 
The IOC and IAAF’s efforts to ensure a level playing field 
in international sports competitions have effectively undercut 
much of the progress made in the realm of women’s sports. By 
insisting that female athletes possess androgen levels below the 
“male” level, these organizations have oversimplified what it 
means to be a woman. Furthermore, the imposition of an 
artificial definition of woman upon athletes precludes from 
competition certain athletes that have always considered 
themselves to be female. 
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